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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Petitioner, James Kevin Buell (hereinafter "BUELL"), appeals the disqualification 
of his commercial driving privileges by the Idaho Transportation Department (hereinafter 
"ITD"). Said disqualification followed an administrative hearing, requested by BUELL, 
before a hearing officer appointed by ITO. The hearing officer upheld the suspension as 
did the District Court and BUELL filed the instant appeal. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Respondent agrees with the course of the proceedings outlined by the Petitioner. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACT 
On October 21,2006, BUELL was cited for Driving Under the Influence (DUI) 
while driving a non-commercial vehicle. Court's Exhibit 1, p. 7. BUELL refused the 
breath test. As a result, his driver's license was seized and he was served with a 
Suspension Advisory and temporary non-commercial driving permit Jd., R.p.68. 
On December 22, 2006, BUELL made a plea agreement with the prosecuting 
attorney. In exchange for a plea of guilty to the DUI, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the 
administrative refusal proceeding and agreed to recommend back-dating the driver's 
license suspension to the date of arrest [October 21,2006]. Jd., p. 8; R. p.24. BUELL's 
driver's license is returned to him. R. ,po 24. On February 27, 2007, the prosecuting 
attorney and BUELL (through his attorney) stipulate to re-schedule the sentencing to July 
of2007. R., p. 25. 
On July 10, 2007, BUELL is sentenced for the DUI. As part of the sentence, the 
judge suspended his non-commercial driver's license for 90 days, beginning on October 
21,2006 [and therefore ending on or about January 21, 2007). R., p.35. 
On July 19, 2007, lTD sent BUELL a "Notice of Disqualification." R., p. 51. 
This Notice provided that, since BUELL had a CDL and had been convicted of a DUI, 
then pursuant to Idaho Code Section 49-335: 
By statute, the Idaho Transportation Department is withdrawing your driving 
privileges to operate a commercial vehicle for 366 days effective August 6, 2007 
through August 6,2008, Idaho Code 49-326(1)(E) and 49-335. No restricted 
driving privileges permit CMV operation. 
Id, p. 51. 
On August 1,2007, BUELL appealed the action against his CDL. R., p. 48. The 
matter was set for hearing before an administrative hearing officer, which was held on 
August 31,2007. R., p.37. 
The hearing examiner upheld the disqualification for one year of BUELL's 
commercial driving privileges. R., p. 37-41. And, at the end of the decision, the hearing 
officer wrote that it is "recommended that his disqualification be made retroactive to 
November 21, 2006, that actual date he ceased having commercial driving privileges 
arising out of the same incident. His class D privileges shall not be affected." R. p. 39. 
lTD disagreed with a retroactive suspension. On September 7,2007, lTD wrote 
the hearing officer requesting reconsideration of the hearing officer's recommendation 
that the suspension be "back dated to November 21,2006." R., p. 35. In this letter, the 
Driver Services Manager Edward Premble wrote, in part: 
On October 21, 2006 Mr. Buell refused to submit to BAC testing and at that time 
his license was seized and he was issued an unrestricted driving permit. On 
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October 26,2006, through his attorney Mr. Buell requested a hearing on the 
proposed suspension due to the refusal with the appropriate court. A hearing was 
set for November 17,2006. On November 15, on behalf of Mr. Buell, his attorney 
filed a stipulation to vacate and continue the refusal hearing due to scheduling 
conflicts. In addition to the continuance of the hearing, the stipulation also agreed 
that Mr. Buell's driving privileges remain valid until a hearing was conducted. 
This stipulation agreed to by the court on November 16, 2006. On December 22, 
2006 and [sic) order was signed by the court vacating and dismissing the license 
suspension proceedings on the refusaL 
On July 10, 2007 Mr. Buell was convicted of DUI and his license was suspended 
by the four to 90 days commencing Oct. 21,2006, the day of the incident. 
At no time was Mr. Buell officially informed by the court, a law enforcement 
officer or by the Department that his CDL privileges were withdrawn until our 
notification letter was sent on July 19,2007. In reality, the information provided 
by the court orders and stipulation would indicate that his license was not 
suspended and he was informed of that. Therefore, Mr. Buell has only served zero 
(0) days of suspension/disqualification. Thus, backdating the disqualification in 
this case would result in giving Mr. Buell credit for time he never served. 
R. pp. 35-36. 
On October 1, 2007, ITD sent BUELL a second "Notice of Disqualification" 
because of his DUI conviction. This Notice provided in part: 
By statute, the Idaho Transportation Department is withdrawing your driving 
privileges to operated a commercial vehicle for 366 days effective July 10, 2007 
through July 10,2008, Idaho Code 49-326(l)(E) and 49-335. No restricted 
driving privileges permit CMV operation. 
On October 5,2007, lTD wrote to the hearing officer and copied BUELL's 
attorney informing the hearing officer that ITD was withdrawing the motion to reconsider 
and that ITD had issued its notice withdrawing BUELL's CDL qualification to coincide 
with his conviction date of July 10,2007. R. p. 17. A second letter was sent by ITD to 
BUELL's attorney on October 5, 2007. R., p. 15-16. In this letter, ITD stated in part: 
The department has determined that it is not bound to comply with the 
recommendation made by the hearing officer to backdate the CDL DQ action. 
The hearing officer ahs verbally concurred with the department's decision and 
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further indicated that a recommendation is not a ruling or order and as a result 
there is nothing for him to rule on regarding the motion for reconsideration. 
The department has backdated Mr. Buell's non-commercial driving privileges 
suspension in accordance with the judge's order. However, based on the Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) rules and regulations, Mr. Buell's 
CDL DQ start date will coincide with the July 10, 2007 DUI conviction date. I 
have included a copy of our letter of October 1, 2007 to you client informing his 
of these amended DQ dates. 
As indicated in this letter of October 1, 2007, an administrative hearing may be 
requested to ITD as to this action. Under the provisions ofIC 49-326(4) a hearing 
will be held within 20 days upon receipt of a written request. 
On or about October 10, 2007, BUELL filed a Petition for Judicial Review. R. p. 
1-2. An Amended Petition for Judicial Review was filed on October 17, 2007. R., p. 3-4. 
And on October 17, 2007, the Court issued an exparte order staying enforcement of the 
disqualification action by lTD and reinstating BUELL's CDL. 
On December 18, 2009 a hearing was held before the Honorable Fred Gibler on 
the Petition for Judicial Review. The Honorable Judge Gibler upheld the decision of the 
hearing officer and the one year suspension of BUELL's CDL. R., p.71. The Judge also 
ordered the "stay" on enforcement of the disqualification remain in place pending the 
appeal. Tr., p. 13-14 (Hearing on Dec 18,2009). 
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
BUELL brings the following issues before this Court on appeal: 
1. Does an administrative suspension of a commercial driver's license, pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 49-335, violate the principles of double jeopardy? 
2. Should BUELL'S commercial driver's license disqualification be retroactive to 
November 21, 2006? 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A Standard of Review 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of 
department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a person's 
driver's license. See I.C. §§ 49-201,49-330,67-5201(2),67-5270 and In re Suspension of 
Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Idaho 937,155 P.3d 1176 (Ct.App. 2006). In an appeal 
from the decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity under IDAPA, this 
Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's decision. Marshall 
v. Idaho Dep't ofTransp., 137 Idaho 337,340,48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct.App.2002). This 
Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the 
evidence presented. I.C. § 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. This 
Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); 
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48 P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's factual 
determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting 
evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial 
competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex rei. Bd. ofComm's, 134 
Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the 
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported 
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by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision must 
demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a 
substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998). If the agency's decision is not 
affirmed on appeal, "it shall be set aside ... and remanded for further proceedings as 
necessary." I.C. § 67-5279(3). 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, over which the Court 
exercises de novo review. In State v Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 125 P .3d 522 (2005), the 
court explained: 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, over which this Court 
exercises de novo review. The party challenging a statute on constitutional 
grounds bears the burden of establishing that the statute is unconstitutional and 
"must overcome a strong presumption of validity." An appellate court is obligated 
to seek an interpretation of a statute that will uphold its constitutionality. 
Additionally, "it is a general rule that 'a legislative act should be held to be 
constitutional until it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that it is not so, and that 
a law should not be held to be void for repugnancy to the Constitution in a 
doubtful case.' " 
ld., at 169 [citations omitted). 
B. Discussion 
1. Idaho Code Section 49-335 Do Not Violate Double Jeopardy 
Principles Because it is Civil In Nature. 
BUELL argues that, under the double jeopardy analysis by the United States 
Supreme Court in Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (hereinafter Hudson), 
Idaho Code Section 49-335, violates double jeopardy. His argument is without merit. 
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(l) THE LA W. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides 
that no "person [shall] be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy oflife 
or limb." The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three abuses: a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same 
offense after conviction, and multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. See 
State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619 (2001). 1 The third of these protections is at issue in this 
case. 
The United States Supreme Court has provided guidance in addressing issues of 
double jeopardy. In Hudson, the Court stated: 
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no "person [shall] be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." We have long 
recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the imposition of all 
additional sanctions that could, " 'in common parlance,' " be described as 
punishment. The Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal 
punishments for the same offense and then only when such occurs in successive 
proceedings. 
Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter 
of statutory construction. A court must first ask whether the legislature, "in 
establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a 
preference for one label or the other." Even in those cases where the legislature 
"has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further 
whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect". 
In making this latter detennination, the factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,168-169 (1963), provide useful guideposts, including: (1) 
"[w]hether the sanction involves an affinnative disability or restraint"; (2) 
"whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes 
into play only on a finding of scienter"; (4) "whether its operation will promote 
the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether the 
behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative 
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it"; and (7) 
"whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned." It is 
important to note, however, that "these factors must be considered in relation to 
I The Petitioner does not contend that the Idaho Constitution affords any greater protections than the United 
States Constitution, therefore this analysis shall focus of the United States Constitution. 
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the statute on its face," id., at 169, and "only the clearest proof' will suffice to 
override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil 
remedy into a criminal penalty, Ward, supra, at 249 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Hudson, at 99-100 (citations omitted). In Hudson, the government had administratively 
imposed monetary penalties and occupational disbarment on the petitioners for violating 
federal banking statutes, later the government criminally indicted the petitioners for 
essentially the same conduct. The petitioners argued that the indictment was barred by 
the principles of Double Jeopardy. The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court, applying 
the analysis from Us. v Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), and rejecting the analysis applied in 
us. v. Harper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), found that the criminal indictment did not violate 
the principals of double jeopardy. Initially, the Court held that the subject law which 
authorized the sanctions and disbarment was civil in nature. In discussing the other 
factors of the Ward test, the Court stated: 
Turning to the second stage of the Ward test, we find that there is little evidence, 
much less the clearest proof that we require, suggesting that either acc money 
penalties or debarment sanctions are "so punitive in form and effect as to render 
them criminal despite Congress' intent to the contrary." Ursery, supra, at 290. 
First, neither money penalties nor debarment has historically been viewed as 
punishment. We have long recognized that "revocation of a privilege voluntarily 
granted," such as a debarment, "is characteristically free of the punitive criminal 
element." Helvering, 303 U.S., at 399, and n. 2. Similarly, "the payment of fixed 
or variable sums of money [is a] sanction which ha[ s] been recognized as 
enforcible by civil proceedings since the original revenue law of 1789." Id., at 
400. 
Second, the sanctions imposed do not involve an "affirmative disability or 
restraint," as that term is normally understood. While petitioners have been 
prohibited from further participating in the banking industry, this is "certainly 
nothing approaching the 'infamous punishment' of imprisonment." Third, neither 
sanction comes into play "only" on a finding of scienter. The provisions under 
which the money penalties were imposed, 12 U.S.C. §§ 93(b) and 504, allow for 
the assessment of a penalty against any person "who violates" any of the 
underlying banking statutes, without regard to the violator's state of mind. "Good 
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faith" is considered by OCC in determining the amount of the penalty to be 
imposed, § 93(b)(2), but a penalty can be imposed even in the absence of bad 
faith. The fact that petitioners' "good faith" was considered in determining the 
amount of the penalty to be imposed in this case is irrelevant, as we look only to 
"the statute on its face" to determine whether a penalty is criminal in nature. 
Kennedy, 372 U.S., at 169. Similarly, while debarment may be imposed for a 
"willful" disregard "for the safety or soundness of [an] insured depository 
institution," willfulness is not a prerequisite to debarment; it is sufficient that the 
disregard for the safety and soundness of the institution was "continuing." § 
1818( e)(1 )(C)(ii). 
Fourth, the conduct for which OCC sanctions are imposed may also be criminal 
(and in this case formed the basis for petitioners' indictments). This fact is 
insufficient to render the money penalties and debarment sanctions criminally 
punitive, particularly in the double jeopardy context. 
Finally, we recognize that the imposition of both money penalties and debarment 
sanctions will deter others from emulating petitioners' conduct, a traditional goal 
of criminal punishment. But the mere presence of this purpose is insufficient to 
render a sanction criminal, as deterrence "may serve civil as well as criminal 
goals." Ursery, supra, at 292; see also Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 
(1996) ("[F]orfeiture ... serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive 
purpose"). For example, the sanctions at issue here, while intended to deter future 
wrongdoing, also serve to promote the stability of the banking industry. To hold 
that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions "criminal" 
for double jeopardy purposes would severely undermine the Government's ability 
to engage in effective regulation of institutions such as banks. 
Hudson at 104-105 (citations omitted). 
Two Idaho cases have discussed the analysis provided the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Hudmn. In State v. Gragg, 143 Idaho 74, 137 P.3d 461 (Ct.App. 2005), the defendant 
was a convicted sex offender in 1989. In 1993, the Idaho legislature passed the Sexual 
Offender Registration Act. In 2003, after his release from prison, the defendant was 
charged with failing to register under the Act. Gragg moved to dismiss the charge on the 
grounds it constituted a retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause of 
the United States and Idaho Constitutions. 
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Gragg argued that the effects of the Act were so punitive that it negated the Idaho 
Legislature's attempt to create a civil scheme. The Idaho Court of Appeals began its 
analysis by citing the factors most relevant to the analysis are whether the regulatory 
scheme in its necessary operation: has been regarded in our history and traditions as a 
punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with 
respect to its purpose. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
As to the punishment factor, Gragg argued that registering as a sex offender was 
humiliating and dissemination of the information created a state mandated "scarlet letter." 
The Idaho Court rejected this argument stating "widespread public access is necessary for 
the efficacy of the scheme, and the attendant humiliation is but a collateral consequence 
of a valid regulation." 
Gragg also argued that the Act was punitive in that dissemination of the 
information rendered him unable to get a job. Citing a case from Alaska, the Court was 
not persuaded and stated that "any negative impact on the sex offender is not the result of 
registration, be instead flows from the conviction itself." 
Finally, Gragg argued that the imposition of a fee constituted a penalty. The 
Court disagreed and held that had failed to show that the effects of the sex offender 
registration were so punitive as to override the legislative intent to create a civil, 
regulatory scheme. 
In State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619,38 P.3d 1275 (Ct. App. 2002), a professional 
counselor appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation by a medical provider. Prior to 
his trial, he had stipulated to a Consent Order by the Idaho State Counselor Licensing 
Board, where he was suspended from his practice and agreed to pay certain fines and 
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costs. He argued in part that the subsequent criminal charges violated double jeopardy. 
Applying the factors in Hudson, the Court of Appeals disagreed. After determining that 
the fines were civil in nature, the Court's analysis follows: 
Nevertheless, we must also inquire whether the statutory scheme governing 
the fine imposed upon McKeeth was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to 
transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. 
First, the fine imposed by the ISCLB does not involve "an affirmative disability 
or restraint" as that term is normally understood. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104, 
118 S.Ct. at 496, 139 L.Ed.2d at 462. Second, money penalties have not 
historically been viewed as punishment. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104, 118 S.Ct. at 
495, 139 L.Ed.2d at 462. The "payment offixed or variable sums of money [is a] 
sanction[ ] which has been recognized as enforceable by civil proceedings since 
the original revenue law of 1789." Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,400,58 
S.Ct. 630, 633,82 L.Ed. 917, 922 (1938); see also Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104, 118 
S.Ct. at 496, 139 L.Ed.2d at 462. 
Third, the stipulation provided that McKeeth had violated certain provisions 
of the American Counseling Association (ACA) Code of Ethics, which had been 
adopted by the ISCLB. See IDAPA 24.15.01.360. Provision A.7.a of the ACA 
Code of Ethics provides that counselors "do not have any type of sexual 
intimacies with clients." Provision C.5.e provides that counselors "do not use their 
professional positions to seek ... sexual favors." These provisions prohibit conduct 
without regard to whether the perpetrator had knowledge of guilt. Thus, the fine 
imposed upon McKeeth does not come into play only on a finding of scienter. 
Fourth, we note that the conduct sanctioned in the instant case by the ISCLB 
is also criminalized by I.e. ss 18-919 and 54-3408. However, this is insufficient 
to transform the minor fine imposed upon McKeeth into a criminal punishment. 
See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105, 118 S.Ct. at 496, 139 L.Ed.2d at 463. By itself, the 
fact that a statute has some connection to a criminal violation is far from the 
clearest proof necessary to show that a proceeding is criminal. Hudson, 522 U.S. 
at 105, 118 S.Ct. at 496, 139 L.Ed.2d at 463; Berglund, 129 Idaho at 757, 932 
P.2d at 880. 
Fifth, we recognize that the imposition of monetary penalties will have a 
deterrent effect, which is a traditional goal of criminal punishment. However, the 
mere presence of this purpose is insufficient to render a sanction criminal, as 
deterrence may serve civil as well as criminal goals. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105, 118 
S.Ct. at 496, 139 L.Ed.2d at 463. Although the fines imposed by the ISCLB may 
be intended to deter future wrongdoing, the tines are deposited directly into the 
bureau of occupational licensing account in order to fund the ISCLB in its efforts 
to promote the integrity of the counseling profession as a whole. See I.e. ss 54-
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3400; 54-3404; 67-2609(7). To hold that the presence of a deterrent purpose 
renders such sanctions criminal for double jeopardy purposes would severely 
undermine the state's ability to engage in effective regulation of the practice of 
counseling. See 58 I.C. s 54-3400 (Regulation and control of the practice of 
counseling is in the public interest.). Lastly, we cannot say that a maximum fine 
of $1 ,000 per violation of I.e. s 54-3407 is excessive in relation to the civil 
purposes underlying the fine. (fn4) 
Based upon the factors discussed above, McKeeth has failed to show by 
clearest proof that the fine imposed by the ISCLB was sufficiently punitive to 
override the legislative intent that the fine constituted a civil remedy. We hold, 
therefore, that the imposition of the $3000 fine upon McKeeth was not a criminal 
punishment. Consequently, McKeeth's subsequent criminal prosecution did not 
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the federal constitution. 
McKeeth, at 620. 
(2) APPLICA nON OF THE LAW TO THIS CASE. 
Here, BUELL argues that four of the factors discussed above are present in this 
case which results in a statute, Idaho Code § 49-335, which is sufficiently punitive to 
override the legislative intent that the suspension constitutes a civil remedy. The four 
factors cited by the BUELL are: (a) whether a driver's license suspension have been 
historically regarded as punishment; (b) whether the operation of a driver's license 
suspension promotes the tradition aims of punishment; (c) whether the behavior to which 
the driver's license suspension applies is already a crime; and (d) whether an alternative 
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable fur it and whether it 
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 
(a) FA CTOR: The Suspension of a Driver's License Have Not Been Traditionally 
regarded as a Penalty. 
BUELL argues that an Idaho driver's license is a right, not a privilege, and as 
such, taking of a driver's license is subject to due process restraints and "has a punitive 
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criminal element." Petitioner's Brief, page 12. BUELL argues the Idaho Supreme Court 
in State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1, 704 P.2d 333 (1985), recognized that a driver's license is 
a valuable property right and therefore cannot be taken away without being subject to due 
process constraints. Id. Then BUELL argues "because Idaho recognizes a driver's license 
as a right under Hudson, the suspension of a driver's license has a punitive criminal 
element." Id, at 13 . BUELL also argues, apart from the suspension of a driver's license 
suspensions pursuant to Idaho Code §49-335, a driver's license suspension has long been 
a criminal punishment for driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, driving 
without privileges, vehicular homicide, and minors being in possession of alcohol. Id., p. 
14. BUELL's arguments are without merit. 
BUELL's reliance on Ankney rests upon language in the concurring opinion of 
Justice Shepard. The majority opinion in Ankney recognizes that driver's license 
suspensions involve state action and adjudicate important interests of licensees, thus 
licenses may not be taken without due process. State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1, 3, 704 P.2d 
333, 336. The majority of the court stated: 
Although an individual does have a substantial right in his driver's license, the 
state's interest in preventing intoxicated persons from driving far outweighs the 
individual's interest, particularly when the individual is entitled to the prompt 
post-seizure hearing mandated by I.e. § 49-352(2)(c)? 
Id., at 5, 704 P.2d 333, 337. In his concurring opinion, Justice Shepard refers to a driver's 
license as a valuable property right, but only in the context of United States Supreme 
Court decision supporting the validity of a statute which would permit police officers to 
immediately size a driver's license upon arrest. There is no support in Ankney for 
2 I.e. § 49-352(2)(c) was repealed in 1984. 
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BUELL's contention that (1) Idaho recognizes a driver's license as a right, or (2) that 
suspension of a license has a punitive element. 
Contrary to BUELL position, license suspensions have not traditionally been 
viewed as a punishment. Suspension of a CDL is similar to the disbarment action at issue 
in the Hudson case since both affect future employment opportunities. In Hudson the 
Court stated: 
First, neither money penalties nor debarment has historically been viewed as 
punishment. We have long recognized that "revocation of a privilege voluntarily 
granted," such as a debarment, "is characteristically free of the punitive criminal 
element." 
Hudson, at 104. Similarly, disqualification of a CDL is the revocation of a privilege 
which was voluntarily granted and is therefore free of a punitive criminal element. 
Further, in Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 207 
P.3d 988 (2009), the Court stated: 
Although we have held the power to operate a motor vehicle upon the public 
streets and highways is a right or liberty that is afforded constitutional protections, 
we have never specifically recognized that a driver's license is a " property 
interest" in Idaho. 
Id., at 263, 207 P.3d 988, 994 (upholding driver's license suspension under Family Law 
License Suspensions Act (FLLSA) for nonpayment of child support). Therefore, there is 
no authority to demonstrate that a punitive criminal element is at the basis of a driver's 
license suspension, either currently or historically. 
(b) FACTOR: The Suspension ofa Driver's License Will Promote Traditional 
Aims of Punishment. BUELL argues that "it is clear that a driver's license suspension 
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promotes retribution and deterrence." Petitioner's Brief, page 15. This argument also 
lacks merit. 
Here, the conduct for which the license suspension was imposed (failure of an 
evidentiary test) was also criminal and formed the basis of a criminal DUI charge, 
however, that fact is not sufficient to render the license suspension criminally punitive. 
Again, Hudson is instructive. In Hudson, the Court stated: 
Fourth, the conduct for which acc sanctions are imposed may also be criminal 
(and in this case formed the basis for petitioners' indictments). This fact is 
insufficient to render the money penalties and debarment sanctions criminally 
punitive, Ursery, 518 U. S., at 292, particularly in the double jeopardy context, see 
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993) (rejecting "same-conduct" test 
for double jeopardy purposes). 
Hudson, at 105. Further, in Talvera, the court held that the remedial purpose ofIdaho 
Code § 18-8002A (quickly revoking driving privileges from those who show themselves 
to be safety hazards by driving over the limit BAC) was not outweighed by the deterrent 
purpose of the same sanction. The court stated: 
Like the administrative license suspension statute at issue in Savard, the stated 
purpose of section 18-8002A is to "provide maximum safety. f1 Id. This objective 
is accomplished by expediting the removal of drivers who fail the BAC 
evidentiary test from the public roads, thus avoiding the often time-consuming 
delays inherent in criminal prosecutions. Id. The remedial purpose of the 
suspension is apparent and very directly addresses the problems of removing 
drivers from the road who should not be driving. Further, a 90-day suspension 
with the possibility of a restricted permit being issued after 30 days is not 
disproportionate to the statute's legitimate remedial goal of expeditious protection 
of the public from drunk drivers. The prosecution for driving under the influence 
is not barred under the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
Id., at 705,905 P.2d 633,638. Therefore, the mere fact that BUELL's conduct led to 
criminal charges does not mean that a civil license suspension amounts to a criminal 
penalty. 
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(c) FACTOR: Whether the Behavior to which the Sanction applies is already a 
Crime. BUELL argues that the conduct sanctioned by the license suspension (the DUI) 
wa') also criminalized by Idaho Code Section 49-335. However, this is insufficient to 
transform the license suspension imposed upon BUELL by ITD into a criminal 
punishment. In McKeeth, the Idaho Court discussed this factor and stated: 
Fourth, we note that the conduct sanctioned in the instant case by the ISCLB 
is also criminalized by I.e. ss 18-919 and 54-3408. However, this is insufficient 
to transform the minor fine imposed upon McKeeth into a criminal punishment. 
See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105, 118 S.Ct. at 496, 139 L.Ed.2d at 463. By itself, the 
fact that a statute has some connection to a criminal violation is far from the 
clearest proof necessary to show that a proceeding is criminal. Hudson, 522 U.S. 
at 105, 118 S.Ct. at 496, 139 L.Ed.2d at 463; Berglund, 129 Idaho at 757,932 
P.2d at 880. 
McKeeth at 622. The Court in Hudson also discussed this factor and stated: 
Finally, we recognize that the imposition of both money penalties and debarment 
sanctions will deter others from emulating petitioners' conduct, a traditional goal 
of criminal punishment. But the mere presence of this purpose is insufficient to 
render a sanction criminal, as deterrence "may serve civil as well as criminal 
goals." Ursery, supra, at 292; see also Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 
(1996) ("[F]orfeiture ... serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive 
purpose"). For example, the sanctions at issue here, while intended to deter future 
wrongdoing, also serve to promote the stability of the banking industry. To hold 
that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions "criminal" 
for double jeopardy purposes would severely undermine the Government's ability 
to engage in effective regulation of institutions such as banks. 
Hudson, at 105. Likewise, the license suspension in this case will serve to deter future 
wrongdoing but it will also serve to ensure that the roads and highways in Idaho are 
protected from unsafe drivers. 
(d) Whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable 
for it and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 
BUELL combines the final two factors in the Hudson analysis and argues (1) the analysis 
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used by the Talavera Court improperly used the truncated Harper analysis and (2) in 
evaluating the sanctions in Idaho Code §49-335, "we must look at all potential 
suspensions provided for in the statute and all the possible circumstances under which 
they could be imposed." Petitioner's Brief, pages 17-18. BUELL's argument is without 
merit. 
In essence, the criminal statute is retrospective, punishing for that which has 
already been done (driving under the influence), where the civil statute, while addressing 
the same behavior is prospective because it removes drivers from the road who should 
not be driving. The "remedial purpose of the suspension is apparent and very directly 
addresses the problems of removing drivers from the road who should not be driving." 
Talavera, 127 Idaho 700, 705, 905 P.2d 633, 638. 
In Talavera, the Court noted that the fact that the sanction serves some deterrent 
purpose is not dispositive. The Court stated: 
Like the administrative license suspension statute at issue in Savard, the stated 
purpose of section 18-8002A is to "provide maximum safety." Id This objective 
is accomplished by expediting the removal of drivers who fail the BAC 
evidentiary test from the public roads, thus avoiding the often time-consuming 
delays inherent in criminal prosecutions. Id The remedial purpose of the 
suspension is apparent and very directly addresses the problems of removing 
drivers from the road who should not be driving. Further, a 90-day suspension 
with the possibility of a restricted permit being issued after 30 days is not 
disproportionate to the statute's legitimate remedial goal of expeditious protection 
of the public from drunk drivers. The prosecution for driving under the influence 
is not barred under the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
Talavera, at 705. 
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Finally, there is a contractual component to the license suspension statute that 
separates the civil suspension remedy from the criminal remedy. In discussing double 
jeopardy, the Court in Talavera stated: 
"The right of a citizen to operate a motor vehicle upon the public streets and 
highways, is subject to reasonable regulation by the state in the exercise of its 
police powers." Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99,101,416 P.2d 46,48 
(1966). "When issued a license, the vehicle operator agrees to abide by certain 
conditions and rules of the road ... and acknowledges that the continued use of 
the license to drive is dependent on compliance with the laws relating to vehicle 
operation." State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265,1267-68 (Me.l995). Thus, 
"suspension of that privilege merely signifies the failure of the holder to comply 
with the agreed conditions." Id at 1268. Obviously one of the agreed conditions 
of the driving privileges is that the driver shall not operate a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol. 
Here, the remedial purpose ofIdaho Code § 49-355 is to remove unsafe drivers 
from the road. Therefore, a license suspension is not disproportionate to the statute's 
legitimate goal of protecting the public from unsafe drivers. 
(3) CONCLUSION: Petitioner's argument that Idaho Code § 49-335 violate the 
principle of double jeopardy lacks merit. As demonstrated above, revocation of a 
privilege voluntarily granted, such as a regular or commercial driver's license, is 
characteristically free of a punitive criminal element. Courts have long recognized 
primarily remedial sanction may serve some deterrent purposes without crossing the line 
to punishment for double jeopardy. 
In sum, there is very little showing, to say nothing of the "clearest proof' as 
required by Ward and Hudson, that the license suspension is criminal. Therefore, the 
subsequent license suspension does not violate the Double Jeopardy clause. 
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2. The Commercial Driver's License Suspension Should Not Be 
Retroactive to November 21, 2006 
BUELL argues that ITO should be estopped on due process grounds from 
imposing an additional disqualification against BUELL. Further, BUELL argues that he 
should receive a retroactive suspension of his COL. This is not the law because the COL 
suspension begins at the time ofthe conviction or when all appeals are exhausted. 
(1) THE LAW Idaho Code Section 49-335 provides for a mandatory suspension 
of COL, and provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a class 
A, B or C driver's license is disqualified from operating a commercial motor 
vehicle for a period of not less than one (1) year if convicted in the fonn of a 
judgment or withheld judgment of a first violation under any state or federal law 
of: 
(a) Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or a 
controlled substance; 
Pursuant to 49 CFR 383.51, the Federal Motion Carrier Safety Administration 
(FMCSA) requires that States use the conviction date, not the offense date, when 
calculating a driver disqualification period. The interpretation of 49 CFR 383.51 by 
FMCSA is as follows: 
Question 7: Must the State use the date of conviction, rather than the offense date, 
to calculate the starting and ending dates for the driver disqualification period 
specified in 49 CFR 383.51? 
Guidance : Yes, the State must use the date of conviction or a later date, rather 
than the offense date, as the basis for calculating the starting and ending dates for 
the driver disqualification period. The State may allow the driver additional time 
after the conviction date to appeal the conviction before the disqualification 
period begins. The use of the conviction date (or the date when all appeals are 
exhausted) ensures that the driver receives due process oflaw but (if the 
conviction is upheld) still serves the full disqualification period 49 CFR 383.51 
requires. For example, a driver is cited for a disqualifying offense on May 1 and is 
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convicted of the offense on July 1. If the offense date were used for the starting 
date ofthe disqualification, it would shorten the actual disqualification by 2 
months. Using the conviction date or a later date when all appeals are exhausted 
ensures that the driver serves the full disqualification period. 
Therefore, BUELL'S request that this Court back date his CDL suspension should 
be denied. 
(2) THE NON-COMMERCIAL DRIVER'S LICENSE. Action taken against 
BUELL's non-commercial driver's license pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-8002A 
was separate and distinct from action taken by lTD against BUELL's CDL endorsement. 
Here, until the Notice of Disqualification was issued on October 1,2007, no action had 
been taken by lTD with respect to BUELL's CDL. 
During the course of his DUI, certain actions were taken against BUELL's non-
commercial driver's license. For example, on October 21,2006, the night BUELL was 
arrested, his driver's license was seized and he was given a temporary license for thirty 
(30) days. R., p. 68. The temporary license was good for 30 days [November 21, 2006], 
when his driving privileges would end for one year because of his refusal to submit to 
alcohol testing. R., p.68. The refusal proceeding was dismissed on December 22, 2006 as 
part of a plea agreement and the court reinstated BUELL's non-commercial driving 
privileges. R., p. 24. Then when BUELL was sentenced on the DUI on July 10,2007, he 
received a suspension of his non-commercial driver's license for 90 days beginning on 
October 21, 2006. R., P. 35. Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-8002(5), that suspension 
of BUELL's non-commercial driver's license was separate and apart from any other 
suspension. Specifically, the law states: 
(5) Any sustained civil penalty or suspension of driving privileges under this 
section or section 18-8002A, Idaho Code, shall be a civil penalty separate and 
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apart from any other suspension imposed for a violation of other Idaho motor 
vehicle codes or for a conviction of an offense pursuant to this chapter, and may 
be appealed to the district court. 
Because BUELL suffered no action against his CDL until October 1, 2007, there is 
simply no basis to order a retroactive suspension of his CDL. 
(3) THE PLEA AGREEMENT BUELL's beliefs about his plea agreement on his 
DUI and his belief about its effect on his CDL are not relevant. The hearing officer made 
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw on this issue and found that BUELL may not have 
made that agreement if he had been aware that lTD would disqualify him for one year. 
See Findings of Fact, page 2. However, the hearing officer concluded that: 
The driver must be held to know the laws of the State of Idaho, particularly as 
they apply to his commercial driving privileges. Further, the State Department of 
Transportation cannot be estopped by the alleged action of a prosecuting attorney. 
There is no estoppel against the state except in its proprietary capacity. 
See, Findings of Fact, page 3. Judge Gibler agreed with the hearing officer. In making 
his ruling, Judge Gibler held: 
To the extent Buell argues that the Idaho Transportation Department is estopped 
by the State's actions in the criminal case, this argument is rejected. There is no 
showing that any representation was made to him by the Idaho Transportation 
Department or that he was misled in either the criminal case or the license 
suspension proceedings as to the status of his commercial license. 
Tr.,p.13 (Dec. 19,2009 hearing). 
BUELL also appears to argue that he believed that his CDL was suspended for 
nine months prior to the hearing on August 31, 2007. For the same reasons discussed 
above, his beliefs regarding the status of the CDL at any given time is not relevant. 
(4) NO AMBIGUITY Finally, BUELL argues that the relevant statutes are 
ambiguous and violate his right to due process. This argument is also without merit. The 
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test to determine if a statute is ambiguous is contained in State v. Browning, ] 23 Idaho 
748, 852 P.2d 500 (CLApp. 1993): 
A statute is ambiguous when the meaning is so doubtful or obscure that 
"reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning." Hickman v. 
Lunden, 78 Idaho 191, 195,300 P.2d 818, 819 (1956). "However, ambiguity is 
not established merely because different possible interpretations are presented to a 
court. If this were the case then all statutes that are the subject oflitigation could 
be considered ambiguous .... [AJ statute is not ambiguous merely because an 
astute mind can devise more than one interpretation of it." Rim View Trout Co. v. 
Higginson, 121 Idaho 819, 823, 828 P.2d 848, 852 (1992). 
Id., at 749. 
Here, the hearing officer specifically found that, as a conclusion of law, that "the 
driver must be held to know that laws of the state of Idaho, particularly as they apply to 
his commercial driving privileges". [emphasis added]. The hearing officer's conclusions 
of law are supported by the facts in the agency record, by the applicable law, and that his 
conclusions did not violate Idaho Code Section 67-5279 in any way. 
Likewise, Judge Gibler was presented the argument about ambiguity relating to 
when his CDL suspension was to begin. In court, Judge Gibler ruled: 
I think Mr. Siebe's made some very good arguments in equity as to why the 
Department should have considered making it retroactive. However, when one is 
dealing with solely a question of statutory construction, I'm bound to follow those 
statutes. Buell was suspended pursuant to Idaho Code Section 49-335. His 
argument is that the statute is confusing because Section 1 suspends a license for 
one year following a conviction. And Section 2 suspends it for one year following 
a refusal to take a BAC. 
A review of the statute reflects no ambiguity. Two distinct periods of 
suspension are set forth in two distinct acts. While Buell may have been confused 
as to when the period of suspension began, his confusion does not mean the 
statute is ambiguous. It is not ambiguous. 
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Tr., p. 12-13 (Dec. 19, 2009 hearing). For the same reasons, this Court should uphold the 
ruling ofthe hearing officer and the District Court and find that BUELL's CDL 
suspension should not bc retroactive. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Idaho Code Section 49-355 does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, nor is 
the statute ambiguous. Therefore the decision ofthe hearing officer and the District 
Court should be affirmed. 
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